Turkey’s central role in NATO matters now because the alliance’s most difficult strategic problems—from the Black Sea to the Middle East—run through geography and capabilities that Ankara controls.
The Ankara summit reinforced that reality. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used the gathering to press for renewed access to advanced US aircraft, sanctions relief and recognition of Turkey’s expanding defence industry. Washington, in turn, needed a cooperative host able to influence several theatres at once.
Turkey’s leverage is the product of deliberate multi-alignment. It remains inside NATO’s collective-defence system while maintaining channels with Russia, Gulf governments and regional actors that many allies cannot reach. It controls the Turkish Straits, fields one of the alliance’s largest militaries and has developed drones, missiles and naval platforms with growing export reach.
That position often frustrates allies. Ankara has delayed consensus decisions, pursued energy ties with Moscow and used security disputes to extract concessions. But those same relationships give Turkey diplomatic and operational access that can be useful during crises.
The strategic bargain is therefore becoming more transactional. Turkey wants technology, investment and greater autonomy. NATO wants bases, maritime access, defence production and political influence across its southern flank.
Personal ties between leaders may accelerate deals, but they do not explain the structural shift. Even a change of government in Ankara or Washington would not alter Turkey’s geography or the alliance’s dependence on it.
NATO’s future will not place Turkey at the centre of every decision. It will, however, require allies to treat Ankara as a pivotal power rather than a difficult peripheral member.
The challenge is to convert Turkey’s leverage into predictable cooperation. An indispensable ally that acts unpredictably can strengthen deterrence in one crisis and complicate it in the next.
